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1 Introduction
The usual approach to vertical externalities establishes that sharing taxes between di¤erent
levels of government has an impact on e¢ ciency. From the seminar contribution by Keen
(1998), a number a papers has dealt with this issue, o¤ering various solutions to internalize
this problem as well (see, for instance, Boadway and Tremblay, 2006). A common issue in
all these contributions is assuming distortionary taxation. In fact, it is clear that vertical tax
externalities only appear as householdsdecisions are inuenced by distorting taxes; otherwise,
the marginal cost of public funds is not a¤ected by lump-sum taxes decided by one level of
government and, consequently, the impact of scal policies across di¤erent tiers of government
does not take place.
Another common feature in this literature is that the labor market is competitive, with the
labor force matching exactly the demand for labor. Papers such as Dahlby and Wilson (2003)
and Kotsogiannis and Martinez (2008) give a central role to the labor supply and demand for
labor in determining equilibria but always with labor market clearing. In such a world, there
is no scope for one of the conventional scal policies aimed at ghting against unemployment,
namely the provision of public inputs. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, no paper so far has
dealt with vertical expenditure externalities (caused by the provision of productivity-enhancing
public expenditures in a federal context) in the presence of unemployment. This has not been
the case when horizontal externalities are involved; Ogawa et al (2006) study the implications
of labor market imperfections on capital tax competition at the same level of governments.
This paper precisely combines vertical externalities and labor market imperfections in a
single model. Indeed, we build a theoretical framework in which the federal government is in
charge of unemployment benets and the states provide a public input with positive e¤ects on
demand for labor. Taxes are assumed to be lump-sum because we are interesting in focussing
on the e¢ ciency implications derived from the expenditure side of government decisions rather
than on vertical tax externalities. Anyway, we will show that ignoring distortionary taxation
as a policy variable may play a crucial role for correcting the vertical externality.
The following contributions can be summarized from our results. Firstly, we prove that,
in spite of using exclusively lump-sum taxes to nance governments (and thus no space for
tax externalities), a vertical expenditure externality arises when unemployment exists. This
conrms a previous result found in the literature (Dahlby and Wilson, 2003; Martinez, 2008),
namely, that both vertical (tax and expenditure) externalities are independent of each other.
The provision of public inputs creates a positive vertical impact on federal revenues as long
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as this type of public spending increases the demand for labor and, therefore, it reduces the
resources needed at federal level for paying unemployment benets. And this occurs without
the co-occupancy of elastic tax bases.
Moreover, we also see how the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs at state
level is closer to the production e¢ ciency condition than the optimal condition in a unitary
country with a non-clearing labor market. In a sense, one could say that more federalism does
not necessarily leads to more ine¢ ciency. Particularly, in the presence of a distortion (in the
labor market, resulting in unemployment), it could be positive for e¢ ciency to bring in a new
distortion (that coming from the vertical expenditure externality).
Secondly, we have studied whether the federal government is able to replicate the equilibrium
of an unitary country. As usual, we have assumed that the upper level of government knows the
statesreaction functions and, behaving as Stackelberg leader, tries to achieve the centralized
outcome. Our result deviates from previous papers as long as we conclude that the policy
variables available for the federal government are not e¤ective instruments to get the unitary
equilibrium. We guess here that the fact of using exclusively lump-sum taxes prevents from
a¤ecting decisions taken by governments and households, in an attempt to internalize the e¤ects
from statespolicy.
In a sense, this result can be placed on the discussion initiated by Sato (2000) about the
capability of federal government to replicate second-best results depending on the federal in-
struments available. Precisely, as result of taking into consideration a new policy instrument,
i. e., a public input provided by the federal government that is complement to that o¤ered by
the states, the upper level of government is able to replicate the second-best outcome of an
unitary country.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the
model and the di¤erent versions of the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs, taking
account whether the country is federal or not. Sections 3 and 4 evaluate the ability of the
federal government to replicate the unitary outcome with the policy instruments available and
with a complementary public input, respectively. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
This section aims to show two points. First, to characterize the equilibrium in a centralized
country with unemployment; this will allow us not only to see how the optimal rule for the
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provision of public inputs must be modied with respect to a situation with full employment,
but also having a benchmark scenario to compare with federal equilibria. Second, to highlight
that the scal decisions taken by one level of government (particularly that with spending
responsabilities on public inputs) will a¤ect other levels of government; consequently, vertical
expenditure externalities will arise despite of using exclusively lump-sum taxes.
The theoretical framework consists of rms, households and two di¤erent tiers of govern-
ment: the federal level and k subnational states. Firms are identical across the country and,
for the sake of simplicity, we assume that their number is normalized to one in each state. All
of them produce a single good on the basis of the following production function:
F (N;K;G) = NK1 G; (1)
where N is labor, K a xed factor and G a public input. Such a production technology allows
us to qualify the public input as factor-augmenting1. In this context, the public spending will
increase the return to the xed production factor K, which we normalized to one, in which case
the prot can be expressed as:2
 = F (N;G)  wN; (2)
where w is the wage rate. Prot maximization implies to dene the rst-order condition w =
FN(N;G), that implictly denes the following function for labor demand:
N (w;G) = 
1
1 G

1 w 
1
1  (3)
Combining equations (2) and (3), the prot function can be obtained:
 (w;G) (4)
We consider that all households have the same preferences for consumption c across the
federation and described by a utility function u(c), which is increasing in c. Each state is
populated by three types of consumers: a rm-owner, employed and unemployed workers,
1An alternative approach would imply a production function with constant returns to scale in all the inputs
(private and public). This would be the case of rm-augmenting public input. It would create economic rents
that, in terms of the model we develop here, would not exhibit substantial di¤erences with respect to what we
obtain below.
2The return to labor is not a¤ected by the public input, although this would be the normal situation with
factor-augmenting public inputs. This is not the case here because we are interested in considering the impact
of the public input on employment, and the demand for labor we obtain below implies that the wage rate is
independent of G. In a model with full-employment, however, we should set up w(M; g).
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which are denoted by superindices "f", "e" and "u", respectively. The rm-owner, endowed
with the production factor K, is who receives the prot in return for hiring the xed factor
to the rm. His budget-constraint is dened by cf =     f , where  f is a lump-sum tax.
Regarding the other two types of consumers, we insert here a distinction between the total
labor force available for workingM and the number of households that e¤ectively are employed
N . Obsviously, full employment is characterized by M = N . The budget constraint for an
employed worker is ce = w    e, where  e is a lump-sum tax, while workers without jobs faces
cu = b, where b denotes a net of tax unemployment benet.
In a centralized country, for the policy variables

 f ;  e; b; G
	
, the government maximizes
a utilitarian welfare function
W = kNue + k [M  N ]uu + kuf (5)
subject to the following budget constraint:
kN e + k f   kG  k [M  N ] b = 0 (6)
In a situation where there is no unemployment, the rst-order conditions are as follows:
FOC
 
 f

:  =
 
uf
0
(7)
FOC ( e) :  = (ue)
0
(8)
FOC (G) : FG = 1 (9)
FOC () : N e +  f  G = 0; (10)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier. The two rst equations show the usual result from optimiza-
tion with lump-sum taxes and transfers: private marginal utility (of each type of consumer)
must be equal to social welfare cost of taxation, which is represented here by the Lagrange
multiplier of government budget constraint. The equation (9) is the standard production ef-
ciency condition in the provision of public inputs. Finally, (10) is the budget constraint of
central government, where the last term of LHS in (6) has been dropped as M = N .
Let us turn to the equilibrium with unemployment. For institutional reasons (i. e., the
existence of a minimum wage), the rate wage is assumed to exceed the market-clearing wage
and, consequently, M > N . Things dramatically change for the optimal provision of G when
unemployment appears; additionally, the rst-order condition for the unemployment benet b
also must be taken into consideration:
FOC (b) :  = (uu)
0
(11)
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FOC (G) :
NG (u
e   uu)

+NG
e +NGb+ FG = 1: (12)
Let us consider now the case of di¤erent tiers of governments. We assume that the federal
level is in charge of providing the unemployment benet while the states provide the public
inputs3. Both levels of government share the tax on employed workers (with the tax rates
T e and te chosen by the federal and states governments, respectively;  e = T e + te). The
revenues collected from the tax on prots are assigned in a proportion  (which is exogenously
determined) to the states (0    1), while the tax rate  f is exclusively decided by the federal
government.
Under such a framework, let us assume that the states behave as Nash players, that is, each
subnational government ignores the impact of its scal decisions on federal revenues. Therefore,
the optimization problem to be solved by the states is:
Max W = Nue (w    e) + (M  N)ub(b) + uf      f (13)
s:t: Nte +  f  G+ S = 0
N = N (w;G)
wo > we;
where S is a vertical lump-sum from the federal government to states. Last inequality refers to
the distorsion existing in the labor market, which is the reason for unemployment. First-order
conditions for te, G and  give:
FOC (te) :  = (ue)
0
(14)
FOC (G) :
NG (u
e   uu)

+NGt
e + FG   1 = 0  
 (15)
FOC () : Nte +  f  G+ S = 0  	 (16)
Expression (14) sets up an identical rule for chosing the optimal tax rate on employed
workers in a centralized country than in a world with two tiers of government. This is a direct
consequence of using lump-sum taxes. Even in the presence of tax sharing between di¤erent
levels of government, if the householdsbehavior is not a¤ected by taxes, there is no scope for
vertical tax externalities.
By contrast, and leaving aside the discussion on the optimal levels of G (see Martinez and
Sjongren (2009) for a further analysis), expression (15) shows the main di¤erence by comparing
3This distribution of spending responsabilities is not crucial for the results, which would be symmetric with
an inverse vertical assignment of public expenditures. Anyway, the scheme we follow here is in line with the
mainstream of theory of scal federalism.
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it to the expression (12). The term NGte di¤ers from its equivalent in (12), namely, NG( e+ b).
As long as the federal government sets up a non-negative tax rate T e on employed workers,
the fact of having states deciding on G leads to reduce the overprovision bias that the presence
of unemployment creates in the provision of public inputs. In other words, expression (15) is
closer to (9) than equation (12).4
In this regard, and contrary to the conventional view in previous literature on vertical
externalities, we guess here that more federalism may lead to more e¢ ciency in the design of
scal policies. To see this in an extreme case, assume that all rent taxes accrue to the states
( = 1); the federal government needs to be nanced by a negative scal grant (from states)
and/or by charging a positive tax rate T eon workers. This latter solution involves an optimal
rule for the provision of public inputs closer to the production e¢ ciency condition, minimizing
the di¤erential e¤ect that the presence of unemployment creates in the discussion on optimality.
Consequently, the behavior of federal government becomes a crucial issue to determine the
e¤ect of unemployment on the achivement of production e¢ ciency condition in the provision
of public inputs. This is what we study in the next section.
3 The ability of federal government to replicate the cen-
tralized outcome
A usual way of correcting vertical (tax and expenditure) externalities is assuming a federal
government behaving as Stackelberg leader. In such a context, the sequence of the game is as
follows. Firstly, the federal government decides on T e,  f , S and, residually, on b, taking into
consideration the statesreaction to changes in federal policy variables. Secondly, the states
choose G and te, taken as exogenous all the decision variables of the upper-level of government.
4It is straightforward to show that with full employment no vertical (tax and expenditure) externalities
appear.
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Consequently, the optimization problem of the federal government is:
Max W = kNue (w    e) + k (M  N)ub(b) + kuf      f (17)
s:t: kNT e + k(1  ) f   k(M  N)b  kS = 0
G = G(T e; ;  f ; S;M;N) (18)
te = te(T e; ;  f ; S;M;N) (19)
N = N (w;G)
wo > we:
Expressions (18) and (19) are the statesreaction functions. Therefore, for solving the federal
problem, some information on comparative statics of these reaction functions is required. To
do that, we start from the rst-order conditions of states (15) and (16)5. Di¤erentiating totally

 and 	 (and ignoring superindex "e" for sake of simplicity in the notation), we have:

GdG+ 
tdt+ 
TdT + 
SdS + 
fd
f = 0
	GdG+	tdt+	TdT +	SdS +	fd
f = 0
This two-equation system can be expressed using a matricial form as follows (and after solving
for dG and dt): 
dG
dt

=  
0@
G 
t
	G 	t
1A 10@
T 
S 
f
	T 	S 	f
1A
0BB@
dT
dS
d f
1CCA (20)
Matricial manipulation on (20) shows that:
dG
dT
= GT = A(	t
T   
t	T ) (21)
dG
dS
= GS = A(	t
S   
t	S) (22)
dG
d f
= Gf = A(	t
f   
t	f ) (23)
dt
dT
= tT = A( 	g
T   
g	T ) (24)
dt
dS
= tS = A( 	g
S   
g	S) (25)
dt
d f
= tf = A( 	g
f   
g	f ) (26)
5The rst-order condition (14) can be ignored in this analysis. In a sense, this expression does not admit
any inuence from federal variables and, consequently, it does not matter at this point. Anyway, expression
(14) can be easily inserted in (15) without modifying substantially the analysis below.
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where A is   1

G	t 	G
t .
Turning back to the federal problem, it is clear that its budget constraint can be written
as b = NT
e+(1 )f S
(M N) . Plugging this into the objective function (17), we obtain the rst-order
conditions for the policy variables of the federal government:
FOC(T e) :  N(ue)0(1 + tT ) + (M  N)(ub)0(bT + bT tT + bGGT ) (27a)
+(uf )
0
(FNNGGT   wNGGT )  ubNGGT = 0
FOC( f ) :  N(ue)0(tf )  ubNGGf + (M  N)(ub)0(bf + bttf + bGGf ) (27b)
+(uf )
0
(FNNGGf   wNGGf )  (uf )0 = 0
FOC(S) :  N(ue)0(tS) + (M  N)(ub)0(bS + bttS + bGGS)  ubNGGS (27c)
+(uf )
0
(FNNGGS   wNGGS) = 0
FOC() : kNT e + k(1  ) f   k(M  N)b  kS = 0 (27d)
Taking into account that b can be residually obtained from the above four equation-system,
we symplify (27a)-(27d) and the following result is achieved:
tT = 0 (28)
tf =  

N
(29)
tS =   1
N
; (30)
where w = FN(N;G), (21)-(23) and the corresponding partial derivatives of 
 and 	 (according
to (15) and (16)) have been used. What is implicitly established in (28)-(30) is the inability of
federal government to a¤ect statesbehavior. In fact, not only the federal tax rate on employed
workers T e has no e¤ect on the equivalent state tax rate te (equation (28)), but also none of the
policy variables of upper level of government has any impact on the state provision of public
inputs. Indeed, from expressions (21)-(23), it is clear that GT = Gf = GS = 0, that is, there is
no way through which the federal government can modify the provision of public inputs. The
unique impact of the federal policy variables ( f and S on te) is trivial: an increase (decrease)
in some of them reduces (rises) the state tax rate in a magnitude given by the number of
employed workers N . Therefore, the highest level of government is not able to replicate not
only the rst-best outcome of (9) but also the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs
in an unitary country with unemployment6.
6Anyway, we must be aware that the rst-best values for T e and te are guaranteed in each scenario as long
as they are lump-sum taxes.
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4 New instruments for federal government: complemen-
tary public inputs
Things may be di¤erent if federal government is also in charge of providing public inputs,
namely GF , which is assumed to be complementary with the state public input (now GS).
Production, prot and labor demand functions have to be conveniently modied:
F
 
N;K;GF ; GS

= NK1 
 
GF
  
G

(31)
 = F
 
N;GF ; GS
  wN; (32)
N
 
w;GF ; GS

= 
1
1 
 
GF
 
1 
 
GS
 
1  w 
1
1  : (33)
As before, combining (32) and (33), the prot function can be written as follows:

 
w;GF ; GS

:
In an unitary country, the government maximizesW = kNue+k [M  N ]uu+kuf , subject
to kN e+k f kGF  kGS k [M  N ] b = 0. In a situation characterized by full employment
(M = N), the optimal provision of public inputs is given by the standard production e¢ ciency
condition: FGF = FGS = 1. By contrast, when unemployment appears as a result of non
market-clearing wage rate, the rst-order conditions for GF and GS are, respectively:
FOC
 
GF

:
NGF (u
e   uu)

+NGF 
e +NGF b+ FGF = 1 (34)
FOC
 
GS

:
NGS (u
e   uu)

+NGS
e +NGSb+ FGS = 1 (35)
It is trivial to show that when the government is concerned with the level of employment, if
the e¤ect of, say, the state public input on labor demand is higher than the equivalent e¤ect
by the federal public input (NGS > NGF ), then the optimal amount of GS will exceed GF .
In a decentralized environment, in which both federal and state government behave as Nash
competitors, the rst-order conditions for GF and GS are, respectively:
FOC
 
GF

:
NGF (u
e   uu)

+NGFT
e +NGF b+ FGF = 1 (36)
FOC
 
GS

:
NGS (u
e   uu)

+NGS t
e +NGSb+ FGS = 1 (37)
Comparing these expressions with (34) and (35), it is clear that both types of public inputs
will be underprovided if governments set positive tax rates on employed workers. Under these
circumstances, the levels ofGF andGS will be below the optimal ones derived from a centralized
10
setting. In other words, each level of government decides a level of public input without
considering its impact on other jurisdictions. Consequently, we are in the presence of a double
vertical expenditure externality from each level of government to the other.
The question now is whether the federal government, behaving as Stackelberg leader, is able
to replicate the second-best outcome. Recall that the answer to this question was "no" in a
setting in which the federal instruments were T e,  f , S and b. With the federal government
also providing a public input, its optimization problem is now:
Max W = kNue (w    e) + k (M  N)ub(b) + kuf      f (38)
s:t: kNT e + k(1  ) f   k(M  N)b  kGF   kS = 0
GS = G(T e; ;  f ; S;M;N;GF ) (39)
te = te(T e; ;  f ; S;M;N;GF ) (40)
N = N
 
w;GS; GF

wo > we:
Note that the statesreaction functions (39) and (40) now include a new argument: the federal
public input GF . As before, we rst need to know some comparative statics of these functions.
Equations (21)-(26) are still valid in the new context -with a slight change: the term A must
be substituted by A0 -(see below)- and we only have to add the corresponding response of GS
and te to the new federal policy instrument GF . Particularly, we can write:
dGS
dGF
= A0(	t
GF   
t	GF ) (41)
dt
dGF
= A0( 	GS
GF   
GS	GF ); (42)
where A0 is   1


GS
	t 	GS
t
.
In this regard, a principal di¤erence with respect to the previous framework appears. While
in Section 3 the federal government only had a very limited (and trivial) impact on state tax
rate t (recall expressions (28)-(30) and the fact that GT = Gf = GS = 0), things are quite
di¤erent now. Consider rst the case of dG
S
dGF
; after some algebra manipulations it can be seen
that the e¤ect of changes in the federal public input on the state provision of public inputs is
given by:
dGS
dGF
=  (NGSGF (u
e   uu) =) +NGSGF t+ FGSGF
(NGSGS (ue   uu) =) +NGSGS t+ FGSGS
> 0:
This means that an increase in the federal public input encourages the provision of the state
public input. That is, there is an additional channel through which the federal government can
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a¤ect statesbehavior. In the case of the state tax rate it happens something similar:
dt
dGF
=   t
N

NGS
dGS
dGF
 NGF

Q 0:
But here the e¤ect of federal public input on state policy variable is not so clear. Indeed, an
increase in the federal public input may lead to either an increase or a decrease in the state tax
rate on employed workers. Anyway, it is worth to noting that again federal government may
a¤ect statesbehavior, which was not possible under the previous assumptions.
Given this, the rst-order condition for the optimal provision of GF is as follows:
FOC
 
GF

:
NGF (u
e   uu)

+
NGS
dGS
dGF
(ue   uu)

 N dt
dGF
+NGFT+NGS
dGS
dGF
T+b(NGF+NGS
dGS
dGF
) = 1:
(43)
After some algebra manipulations, it can be shown that to replicate the second-best condition
(34) requires to hold:
NGS
dGS
dGF

ue   uu

   + b

= FGF : (44)
If the individual utility is assumed to be linear (u(c) = c), it is straightforward to prove that
both sides of expression (44) have the same sign. Hence, to replicate the second best outcome
for the provision of public inputs is a real possibility when federal government can spend money
in public inputs which are complementary to state public inputs.
5 Concluding Remarks
Vertical externalities use to involve challenges for e¢ ciency in federal countries. Sharing taxes
between di¤erent levels of government or the provision of certain public expenditures with e¤ects
on other tiers of governments revenues, imply deviations from the optimality rules which would
be obtained in a centralized world. However, the presence of vertical (tax and expenditures)
externalities can be disregarded if lump-sum taxes are used. Indeed, the idea of governments
a¤ecting scal decisions taken by others requires distorting taxes able to modify households
behavior.
All these general statements have to be qualied in the presence of unemployment, and
this has been what we have done in this paper. Particularly, we have built a simple model
with lump-sum taxes and unemployment in which the optimal rule for the provision of public
inputs depends on whether the structure of the country is federal or not. Indeed, while there
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is no scope for vertical tax externalities (the fact of using lump-sum taxes here is crucial), a
deviation from the second-best outcome takes place when states are in charge of the provision
of productivity-enhancing public factors and the federal government nances unemployment
benets.
We have conrmed that the optimality condition for the provision of public inputs must
consider the impact of this type of public expenditures on employment and, consequently, on
public spending in unemployment benets. As the production e¢ ciency condition for public
inputs is not satised even in the case of a centralized country, we have analyzed what would
occur when states behaving as Nash players take part in the game. Since subnational gov-
ernments do not take into account the e¤ect of their public expenditures on unemployment
benets, the overprovision of public inputs (compared to the rst-best case with full employ-
ment) is lower with a federal structure than in an unitary country. In a sense, one can say
that considering a new distortion (a vertical expenditure externality) in a world with previous
distortions (unemployment) may improve the e¢ ciency in the sense of coming close the state
behavior to the production e¢ ciency in public inputs.
When we have wondered about the capability of federal government to replicate the out-
come of an unitary country, we have assumed that the upper level of government behaves as
Stackelberg leader, considering the states reactions functions. Under such a scenario, we have
concluded that, unlike previous papers, federal government is not able to internalize the vertical
expediture externality. Federal policy variables have no impact on statesdecision variables.
In part, this is caused by using lump-sum taxes; indeed, distortionary taxation can a¤ect
agents behavior and this is the way through which all the e¤ects of public inputs can be
internalized. By contrast, when the federal government is also in charge of providing a public
input which is complementary to the state public input, it is possible to replicate the second-best
outcome for the optimal provision of such as public inputs.
A number of issues arises for further research. Asymmetries at regional level in the federation
can be taken into consideration. Given our federal budget constraint, the characterization of
equilibria may then involve that not all the resources collected by the upper level of government
in a region must be spent in such territory; consequently, some possibilities for horizontal
redistribution arise and even for explicit equalization schemes. Also under this framework, in
the presence of mobile production factors, phenomena of tax competition may take place, with
the consequent e¤ects on e¢ ciency and regional labor markets.
As policy implication we would underline how important the coordination of di¤erent levels
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of government is to get social welfare gains. Indeed, the design of federal and state scal policies
must take into account the magnitude of their cross e¤ects on tax revenues of others liers of
government. Particularly, this is specially true in the case of public infrastructure because this
type of government expenditure is very vulnerable to public spending cuts and the visibility of
its benets. Improving e¢ ciency here, for instance, increasing the coordination in the provision
of public transport infrastructure (some of them provided at regional level, say, roads; others
by the federal government, say, railways) means more social welfare, part of it in terms of
employment.
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